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In this paper, we explore the effect of identity salience on behavior in a simple social 
interaction.  Specifically, we compare behavior in a ultimatum game across three treatments: 
priming subjects with a shared identity, priming subjects with an identity distinct from those 
with whom they will interact, and priming subjects with no particular identity.  We find that 
subjects are most cooperative in the identity-priming treatment and least cooperative in the 
distinctiveness-priming treatment. Similarly, subjects reveal the highest demands in the 
identity-priming treatment and the lowest demands in the distinctiveness-priming treatment. 
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Each individual has any number of identities. These may include one's ethnic iden-
tity, gender identity, corporate identity, or national identity. Past research has shown
that each of these identities can be more or less salient at any moment of time and
the relative salience of dierent identities can signicantly aect behavior (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000, 2004). Experiments have shown that priming certain pre-existing
identities in individuals can aect tasks such as exam performance (Steele and Aron-
son, 1995; Spencer et al., 1999). For example, Shih et al. (1999) shows that when a
math test was administered to Asian-American women primed with either their ethnic
identity or their gender identity, they performed more or less well, respectively. As
well, Yopyk and Prentice (2005) show that student-athletes primed with either their
student or athlete identity performed more or less well, respectively, on a math exam.
This paper focuses on uncovering how priming identity aects behavior in a simple
social interaction. Specically, we are interested in a social interaction as represented
by an ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game a Proposer receives an endowment
and must decide how much to oer a Responder. If the Responder accepts the oer,
both parties receive the agreed-upon amounts. If the Responder rejects the oer, both
parties receive nothing. Thus, behavior in the ultimatum game can serve as a barom-
eter for cooperativeness and negative reciprocity wherein oers can be seen as signs
of cooperation or generosity, and accept/reject decisions can help identify negative
reciprocity or demandingness.1 In this paper, we are interested in the relationship
between the salience of an individual's identity and their behavior in the ultimatum
game. An understanding of the relationship between cooperativeness or demanding-
ness and an individual's identity will yield insights into the underlying reasons for the
documented reductions in public goods in the presence of population heterogeneity
(e.g., Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 2000).
With respect to motivating shared or distinct identities, past research has shown
that identity is notoriously dicult to create in the laboratory (see Eckel and Gross-
man, 2005; Solow and Kirkwood, 2002). Therefore, we take the approach of increasing
1In this paper, we will dene cooperation as having joint concern for the outcomes oneself and
another, with higher oers re
ecting more cooperation. Note that cooperative behavior in this context
does not require reciprocation on the part of another individual: Only one individual in the game
has the opportunity to extend and oer.
1the salience of an individual's existing identity in order to motivate behaviors such
as cooperation. To our knowledge, while other studies have explored the eects of
salience on task performance (Yopyk and Prentice, 2005; Spencer et al., 1999), no
study has approached the problem of how the salience of existing identity may aect
social interactions. As such, this paper adds to the literature by providing information
on how priming identity aects a social interaction.
In order to incorporate identity-priming into an experiment, we led participants
through a brief identity-priming task along the lines of those used in Yopyk and
Prentice (2005) before having them play a bargaining game. One can think of the
behaviors exhibited in an ultimatum game as being in
uenced by concepts of identity.
That is, past research has shown that group identity can have an eect on cooperation
(McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Wit and Wilke, 1992), reciprocity (McLeish and Oxoby,
2007; Stroebe et al., 2005), and negotiations (Kramer et al., 1993). In Wit and Wilke
(1992), cooperation in simple games was higher among in-group pairs, simply as a
result of random group categorization. In Stroebe et al. (2005), researchers found
evidence that, under certain conditions, participants expected in-group members to
reciprocate more than out-group members, and so participants tended to favor their
in-group. Similarly, in McLeish and Oxoby (2007), higher degrees of cooperation were
found between in-group pairs, as well as higher degrees of negative reciprocity (i.e.
punishment) in response to unfair behavior.
Along the lines of these studies, we see diering degrees of cooperation and negative
reciprocity across treatments following our manipulation of the salience of dierent
identities. We nd that subjects are most cooperative with in-group members after a
shared social identity has been primed, and least cooperative after an identity distinct
from the shared social identity has been primed. Similarly, subjects exhibit the highest
demands after a shared social identity has been primed and the lowest demands after
a distinct identity has been primed.
The results of our experiments have important implications for our understanding
of identity in organizations. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) discusses the extent to which
and employees identication with her employer (or lack thereof) can have signicant
eects in mitigating (or aggravating) problems associated with incomplete contracting
and unobservability. Indeed, if employees identify with their employer or their orga-
nization, they are less likely to engage in shirking or sabotage in the workplace. For
2example, when an organization promotes a positive identity, employees internalize this
and exhibit more cooperation and citizenship (Dutton et al., 1994). Further, when
the identity of the organization is more salient (for example, through more contact
with the organization, longer tenure, etc.), this eect is increased. In the context of
our experiment, a shared identity results in greater cooperation as manifest by larger
oers in ultimatum bargaining. However, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) also discusses
how an identity which is distinct (indeed, contrary) to that of the employer may result
in a worker damaging property or shirking in a manner to reclaim an identity which
distinguishes the individual from her apparent identity as an employee. In our exper-
iment, we observe lower oers in ultimatum bargaining when individuals are primed
with distinct identities. While this is in line with the arguments in Akerlof and Kran-
ton (2005), we also identify a potential cost associated with shared identity. In our
experiments we nd when individuals share a (positive) identity, respnders in ultima-
tum bargaining display greater demandingness vis a vis a willingness to reject larger
oers than no identity if shared. This suggests that, in the context of an organization,
a strong shared identity may manifest itself via greater negative reciprocity. Thus, a
shared identity may result in greater sabotage or shirking in contexts where individu-
als view themselves as being treated unfairly by an employer or other employees with
whom they share an organizational identity.
2 Related Literature
There is substantial evidence that priming individuals' identities can aect task per-
formance. One such example is the literature on stereotype threat: As discussed
above, students who are primed with identities which are typically associated with
performing less well on a task tend to conform to the expectation and indeed perform
less well. Other examples in the literature show that African Americans primed with
their ethnic identity performed less well on an exam (Steele and Aronson, 1995), and
women primed with their gender identity performed less well on a math test (Spencer
et al., 1999).
The stereotype activation literature comes with at least one qualication: Blatant
and subtle stereotype priming may not have similar eects. When stereotypes are sub-
tly primed (Asian-American students completed a survey designed to increase ethnic
3saliency), subjects performed better on a subsequent test, while when stereotypes are
blantantly primed (Asian-American students completed a stereotyping questionnaire),
subjects' performance is not aected (Shih et al., 2002). On the other hand, when
subjects who are not the target of the priming (e.g., non-Asian students) are exposed
to the blatant priming, performance is aected, while exposure to subtle priming has
no such aect.
There is also evidence that priming identities aect aect behaviors other than task
performance. Benjamin et al. (2008) reports the results of priming Asian-American
ethnic identity and African-American ethnic identity.2 When ethnic identity is primed,
Asian-Americans exhibit more patience (i.e. have lower discount rates), and (non-
immigrant) African-Americans exhibit more risk-aversion. In Bargh et al. (1996),
there is evidence that priming an elderly stereotype (through the use of a scrambled-
sentence activity incorporating words relevant to an elderly stereotype, but careful
to omit words referring to slowness) caused undergraduate participants to walk more
slowly as they left the experiment. The authors also report the results of an experi-
ment demonstrating that priming an African-American stereotype (through subliminal
pictures being 
ashed on a computer screen as a subject is working on a tedious task)
caused non-African-American participants to react with more hostility to a computer
error.
Research in both psychology and economics literature has demonstrated that social
identity can aect simple social interactions. As noted above, identity has been shown
to motivate cooperation, reciprocity, and negotiations, but also attitude formation and
polarization (Mackie, 1986), and the dierential treatment of in-group and out-group
members (Bernhard et al., 2006; Durlauf, 1999; Gerber, 1998; Wann and Grieve, 2005).
Experimentally, simple games have been used in the study of group identity and results
have shown individuals to exhibit more cooperative behavior to in-group members,
and punish in-group members more for uncooperative behavior (Goette et al., 2006;
Bernhard et al., 2006; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007). Higher rates of cooperation and
more negative reciprocity between in-group members has even been proposed by the
2In the Asian-American study, identities were primed through the use of a \background question-
naire", using questions regarding the languages used by a participant's parents and grandparents,
the number of generations a participant's family has lived in the U.S., etc. In the African-American
study, identities were primed with a similar questionnaire, however, many of the questions centered
around preferences over a roommate's race.
4theoretical literature: Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
propose that the violation of in-group norms by in-group members can be seen as a
threat to the identity of the group. As such, individuals are motivated to buoy up the
value of the group identity by punishing the oender.
Although identity aects social interactions, past research in economics has found
it challenging to establish an articial identity in the laboratory. For example, Wit
and Wilke (1992) establish group categorization by giving groups a common fate: a
50% chance that each individual would be paid (the personal categorization treat-
ment) or a 50% chance the group would be paid (the group categorization treatment).
While the proportion of cooperative behavior was higher in the group categorization
treatment, the dierence between the two treatments was not great (68% vs. 57%).
In the same vein of research, Solow and Kirkwood (2002) used three treatments: a
stranger treatment, a treatment where groups worked together on a questionnaire, and
a treatment using participants from a common community (e.g. the school's marching
band). Only the treatment using participants from the common community showed
signicant dierences in behavior. In Eckel and Grossman (2005) the only successful
identity-motivating treatment in which behavioral dierences were identied was that
in which group members worked together on an initial task.
3 Experiment and Hypotheses
In our experiment, participants were provided with a piece of paper and asked to write
for 10 minutes on a treatment-specic topic.3 After the 10 minute period, participants
sealed the paper inside an unmarked envelope and the envelopes were collected by the
experimenter.
The treatments were implemented through manipulation of the 10-minute writing
period. In the Identity-Prime (IP) treatment, we attempted to increase the salience
of a shared identity, that of a student at our university: students were asked to write
about a recent positive experience with their fellow students. In our Distinctiveness-
Prime (DP) treatment we attempted to increase the salience of an identity distinct
from our university's: students were asked to write about a recent positive experience
with people other than fellow students. In the No-Prime (NP; control) treatment,
3Sample instructions are presented in appendix A.
5Treatment Name Description
Identity-Prime Participants were asked to write about
a recent positive experience in which
they felt connected to other students
at our university, recalling how they
felt before, during, and after the ex-
perience. The instructions emphasized
focusing on how the experience made
them feel as a student at our univer-
sity.
Distinctiveness-Prime Participants were asked to write about
a recent positive experience outside the
university with individuals who were
not students at our university, recall-
ing how they felt before, during, and
after the experience. The instructions
emphasized focusing on how the expe-
rience made them feel as individuals.
No-Prime (control) Participants were asked to write out de-
tailed directions on how to get from
their dorm room or parking space to
the computer lab in which the experi-
ment was taking place.
Table 1: Details of Treatments
students were asked to write out detailed directions from their dorm room or parking
space to the laboratory where the experiment was being conducted. This treatment
was designed to not aect the salience of anything identity-related. Specic details
about each of the treatments are listed in Table 1. In sum, the IP and DP treatments
bring attention to either shared or distinct identities. We propose that this identity is
salient when engaging in the following stage of the experiment.
After the 10-minute writing period, participants engaged in an ultimatum game.
A typical ultimatum game proceeds as follows: In the role of Proposer, the participant
receives $10 and decides how much of that amount he wishes to allocate to the Re-
sponder. The Proposer's oer is then extended to the Responder, and the Responder
6decides to accept or reject the oer. If the Responder accepts the oer, each partici-
pant receives the agreed upon amounts, while if the Responder rejects the oer, each
participant receives nothing. In the literature, ultimatum game results are consistent,
and robust to variation in the conditions of the game (e.g. the amount of money
initially allocated to the Proposer; see Camerer, 2003). Proposers oer, on average,
about 30-40% of their endowment, and these oers are typically accepted, while oers
below 20% have about a 50-50 chance of getting rejected.
In this experiment, we chose to conduct the ultimatum game using a method sim-
ilar to the strategy vector method (i.e. participants decide on the choices they would
make in either role before the roles are assigned; see Oxoby and McLeish, 2004).4 Par-
ticipants were informed that they would be randomly and anonymously matched over
the computer network with another participant, and one of them would be assigned
the role of Proposer and the other would be assigned the role of Responder. However,
before receiving these assignments, they were to report the choices they would make
in either role (i.e., oer extended in role of Proposer; accept/reject decisions for each
possible oer in the role of Responder). Participants were then grouped into pairs,
put in the role of either Proposer or Responder, and had their corresponding choices
implemented. This method of eliciting responses in the ultimatum game provides us
with the benet of a larger number of observations for potential oers and potential
minimum acceptable oers. Further, since it has been shown that behavior resulting
from the use of this method is not signicantly dierent from behavior in a sequential
decision method ultimatum game (?), the credibility of our results is not compro-
mised. That is, potential oers are equivalent to actual oers, and potential minimum
acceptable oers are equivalent to actual minimum acceptable oers. Participants
made choices in only one ultimatum game, after which they were paid anonymously
and were allowed to leave.
3.1 Hypotheses
Given our design, we are able to test several hypotheses regarding the eects of priming
identity on ultimatum bargaining. First, as mentioned above, research has shown that
4Our method is slightly dierent than the strategy vector method since participants are asked to
make choices in both roles. Conceivably, this may lead subjects to be more strategically-minded than
when just placed in one role.
7sharing an identity leads to greater cooperation (see McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Wit
and Wilke, 1992).5 It follows that priming identity (vs. not priming identity or
priming distinctiveness) will have similar eects on cooperation in our experiment, as
measured through Proposers' oers.
Hypothesis 1 (Potential) oers in the Identity-Priming treatment will be higher than
those in the Distinctiveness-Priming treatment.
The Responder's decision allows us to gain insight into reciprocity, preferences
over fairness, or demandingness. Information on demandingness is contained in the
Responders' minimum acceptable oer (MAO; the lowest oer a Responder indicates
she would accept). The higher the MAO, the higher the oer must be for the Respon-
der not to choose to engage in negative reciprocity (i.e. choose to `reject').
Identity has been shown to have an eect on reciprocity (see McLeish and Oxoby,
2007; Stroebe et al., 2005), in that individuals engage in higher degrees of negative
reciprocity with those whom they identify. Further, as mentioned above, theoretical
research into identity predicts higher rates of negative reciprocity within the in-group
as a response to the violation of in-group norms (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000). Essentially, a violation of an in-group norm is seen as a threat
to identity, and individuals are therefore motivated to act out in order to protect the
value of their identity.
Hypothesis 2 (Potential) minimum acceptable oers in the Identity-Priming treat-
ments will be higher than those in the Distinctiveness-Priming treatment.
4 Results and Analysis
A total of 128 participants, recruited from the student body at our university, par-
ticipated in this experiment. The ultimatum game portion of the experiment was
programmed using Fischbacher (2007).
5Note that identity and cooperation may be positively correlated not because cooperation follows
directly from identity but because there exists social norms prescribing higher degrees of cooperation
to in-group members. Thus, the social norm governing in-group interactions may cause greater
cooperation because (i) an individual wishes to adhere to the social norm, and/or (i) an individual
believes the Responder will have higher expectations of an oer and thus a higher minimum acceptable
oer (MAO).
8First, we concentrate on participants' oers. Recall that since the experiment was
run using the strategy method, we have information on what each participant would
have oered if they were put in the role of Proposer (i.e. potential oers). Mean oers
by treatment are reported in Table 2. Mean oers across treatments vary from a low
of $3.05 in the DP treatment to a high of $3.86 in the IP treatment. The cumulative
distributions of oers, by single treatment, are shown in Figure 1, and the frequencies
of oers, by treatment, are shown in Figure 2. Our results directionally support
Hypothesis 1: The IP treatment tends to have higher oers, the DP treatment tends
to have lower oers, and the oers in the NP treatment are somewhere in-between.
Table 2: Mean Oers, by Treatment
Treatment N Mean Oer Std. Err.
Identity-Prime 42 3.86 1.16
Distinctiveness-Prime 42 3.05 1.56
No-Prime 44 3.61 1.35
For a more robust investigation, we ran one-tailed t-tests of statistical dierences
in mean oers between treatments.6 The p-values from each pairwise test are reported
in Table 3. Oers in IP are signicantly higher than oers in DP, but not signicantly
dierent from the NP treatment. DP delivers signicantly dierent results from both
other treatments: Oers are signicantly less than IP and NP. These results support
hypothesis 1: Oers are signicantly higher when participants are primed with a
shared identity than when participants are primed with a distinct identity.
Given our elicitation method, we have data on each participant's minimum accept-
able oer (MAO). Mean MAOs for the ve treatments are reported in Table 4 with
the cummulative and frequency distributions presented in Figures 3 and 4. Over all
treatments, mean MAOs range from a low of $2.40 in the DP treatment through to
a high of $3.00 in the IP treatment. Again, these results suggest the data is direc-
tionally consistent with Hypothesis 2: More participants in the IP treatment choose
higher MAOs, those in the DP treatment choose lower MAOs, and MAOs in the NP
6We chose to use t-tests for this analysis because our data met the requirements for a t-test and
the t-test gives us more precise results than a non-parametric test.

















Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Oers, By Treatment
Table 3: P-Values Associated with Each Pairwise Comparison of Mean Oers, by
Treatment
IP DP NP
IP - 0.00 0.19
DP - 0.04
NP -















Figure 2: Frequencies of Oers, By Treatment
11treatment are in-between. Thus is appears that priming a shared identity increases
demandingness amongst in-group pairs.
Table 4: Mean Minimum Acceptable Oers, by Treatment




We conduct one-tailed t-tests to identify statistical dierences in MAOs across
treatments and report p-values from each pairwise test in Table 5. We nd that
MAOs in the DP treatments are signicantly lower than MAOs in the IP treatment.
Interestingly, MAOs in the NP treatment are not signicantly dierent from MAOs
in any other treatment. Thus, participants were much more demanding (i.e. reported
higher MAOs) in the IP treatment than in the DP treatment. It seems that while
MAOs in the control treatment, NP, were in-between MAOs in the DP and IP treat-
ments, the dierence between NP and any other treatment was not large enough to
result in statistical signicance.
Table 5: P-Values Associated with Each Pairwise Comparison of Mean Minimum
Acceptable Oers, by Treatment
IP DP NP




This paper is aimed at investigating the eect of identity salience on behavior in
social interactions. Specically, we conduct an experiment where we prime subjects
to increase the salience of a shared identity or a distinct identity, and nd that this

















Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of Minimum Acceptable Oers, By Treatment














Figure 4: Frequencies of Minimum Acceptable Oers, By Treatment
14has a signicant eect on behavior. Under particular circumstances, subjects primed
with a shared identity are signicantly more cooperative and more inclined toward
negative reciprocity than subjects primed with a distinct identity.
The result that increasing the salience of identity increases cooperation may not
be surprising, as manipulation of the salience of identity is often used in such arenas
as politics, to gain support or to acquire backing for a political goal.7 The results
are especially interesting if looked at in the context of labor negotiations and or-
ganizational design. Rabin (1997) discusses the importance of reciprocity in labor
bargaining. Our results suggest that a shared identity among the parties to a negotia-
tion may facilitate agreement through greater cooperation but, if one party views the
other as behaving unfairly, may also generate greater demandingness, increasing the
likelihood of a bargaining impasse. Similarly, increasing the salience of organizational
identity among employees may involve a tradeo between a greater tendency to coop-
erate and a greater tendency to engage in negative reciprocity (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005). This tendency towards negative reciprocity may be especially impactful during
contract disputes, pushing potential outcomes towards ineciency. It follows that a
mediator wishing to avoid a nasty labor negotiation may with to downplay the salience
of the employees' identication with the rm.
7For example, in order to bolster a defence for the Canadian health care system, proponents often
emphasize the fact that it is \uniquely Canadian".
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This is an experiment in decision-making. During the experiment you will be asked
to make a number of decisions, the outcomes of which may result in a monetary payo.
You will receive this payment in cash at the end of the experiment. This payment is
considered both compensation for the time and the eort you put into making your
decisions. Throughout the experiment, we ask you to refrain from speaking with one
another; if you have any questions please raise your hand and someone will assist you.
In the rst part of the experiment, you will be asked to write for 10 minutes
about a recent positive experience in which you felt connected with other University
of Calgary students. This may be an experience at a social event (e.g., a party), an
academic assignment (e.g., a group project), or simply a pleasant interaction with
other students. We would like you to write about this experience in detail, recalling
how you felt before, during, and after the experience. Try to recall any problems you
faced during the interaction and how you overcame them. Try to write about how
this experience made you feel as a University of Calgary student.
Please write on the piece of paper provided. Notice there is no identifying infor-
mation on the envelope. What you write about will remain completely condential
and can in no way be tied to you personally.
After the 10 minute writing period has ended, we would like you to put the piece
of paper in the envelope provided and seal the envelope. The experimenter will then
collect these envelopes and the reminder of the experiment will take place on the
computers.
After you have completed this rst portion of the experiment you will be asked
a series of questions and randomly matched (by the computer) with another person.
Eventually, the computer will assign one of you to the role of Proposer and one of you
to the role of Responder in a game which will determine your payo for the experiment.
Before this random assignment is made, you must indicate what you would do if you
were put in either role.
In the role of Proposer, you will be asked how much (out of a total of $10) you
wish to allocate to the other person. The amount of money that you keep for yourself
will be $10 minus your allocation to the other person. In the role of Responder, you
must indicate for each possible amount allocated to you from the Proposer whether
you would accept or reject such an oer. That is, for each possible oer between 0
and $10, you must indicate whether or not you would accept this oer. Your payo
from the experiment will depend on these decisions.
After everyone has made these decision, the computer will randomly assign each
person the role of Proposer or Responder, and their corresponding choices will be
implemented. That is, the person assigned the role of Proposer will have their oer
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er based on
the choices made for the relevant amount of the oer. If you are assigned the role of
Proposer, you will receive $10 less the oer you extended if the Responder accepts that
oer; if the Responder rejects the oer you extended, you will both receive nothing.
If you are assigned the role of Responder, you will receive the oer extended by the
Proposer if you indicated that you would accept that oer; if you indicated you would
reject that oer you will both receive zero.
You will be informed of your payo from the experiment and asked to complete a
short questionnaire. After everyone has completed the questionnaire, you will receive
your payment in cash. Once we have answered any questions, the experiment will
begin.
Warm-Up Exercises
1. If you are assigned the role of Proposer and you indicated that you would allocate
the other person $3, how much will you receive if this oer is accepted? How
much will you receive if this oer is rejected?
2. If you are assigned the role of Responder and are oered $4, how much will you
receive if you indicated that you would accept a $4 oer? How much will you
receive if you indicated that you would reject a $4 oer?